讲座主题：Internal Ratings and Loan Contracting: Evidence from a State-owned Bank around a Massive Economic Stimulus Programme
讲座老师：原红旗 教授 复旦大学
讲座时间：2019年11月22日下午14:30分
讲座地点：文泉楼南401
主讲人简介：原红旗，复旦大学管理学院会计学系教授、博士生导师，兼任上海财经大学会计与财务研究院研究员，主要研究领域为财务会计与公司财务。在Contemporary Accounting Research，The Accounting Review，会计研究，管理世界等国内外高水平杂志上发表文章多篇。
Abstract：Using a proprietary loan data set, we study how a large state-owned bank uses its internal ratings in loan granting decisions around China’s 2008 economic stimulus programme that relies on bank credit for financing. We find that there is little change in the rating process of the bank, and internal ratings remain a valid, albeit weaker, predictor of loan interest rates in the stimulus period. Weakened rating-interest rate relation is concentrated for borrowers from the industries that the stimulus programme focuses on, for state-owned enterprises (SOEs), for bank branches operating in provinces with a low level of credit market marketization, or when the credit rater and loan officer have no collaboration before. We also find that interest rates remain a valid predictor of ex-post loan outcomes in the stimulus period. Importantly, the rating-interest relation goes back to normal after the stimulus programme ends, suggesting that any deviation is temporary. Overall, there is no evidence that loan decisions of the state-owned bank are severely compromised in the economic stimulus period as speculated by some media. By showing how a state-owned bank maneuvers between supporting government stimulus initiative and maintaining market-based lending, we contribute to the limited literature on the roles of internal ratings in loan contracting decisions, and add to the debate over the roles of state-owned banks.
